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Pennsylvania's Constitutional Right to Privacy: A
Survey of Its Interpretation in the Context of
Search and Seizure and Electronic Surveillance
As decisions of the federal appellate courts have whittled away a
number of rights embodied in the United States Constitution, the
protection of rights under state constitutions has begun to grow in
significance. Accordingly, a number of states have placed new em-
phasis on protecting individual rights of privacy found either ex-
pressly or by implication in their respective organic documents.1
One such right is that protecting personal privacy from unreasona-
ble governmental intrusions.
What has been termed "the right most valued by civilized
men," 2 protection for personal privacy exists implicitly in the
Pennsylvania Constitution. As the following comment will reveal,
the right, found by various Pennsylvania courts to be rooted in Ar-
ticle I, section 1s or section 81 of the state constitution, is clearly a
malleable one, being shaped by the hammer of appellate jurispru-
dence against the anvil of contemporary values and social
principles.
This annealing process has taken on renewed fervor in the past
decade, with a number of privacy-based decisions reaffirming the
right's existence and vitality. The recent decisions in Common-
1. For an overview of the growth of privacy considerations in state court decisions,
see Louis F. Huebner, Rights of Privacy in Open Courts-Do They Exist?, 2 Emerging Is-
sues St Const L 189 (1989).
2. Olmstead v United States, 277 US 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis dissenting), rev'd
Katz v US, 389 US 347, 353 (1964).
3. Article I, section 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution reads:
All men are born equally free and independent, and have certain inherent and inde-
feasible rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty, of
acquiring, possessing and protecting property and reputation, and of pursuing their.
own happiness.
Pa Const, Art I, § 1.
4. Article I, section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution reads:
The people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and possessions from
unreasonable searches and seizures, and no warrant to search any place or to seize
any persons or thing shall issue without describing them as nearly as may be, nor
without probable case, supported by oath or affirmation subscribed to by the affiant.
Pa Const, Art I, § 8.
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wealth v Edmunds5 and Barasch v Pennsylvania Public Utility
Comm'n' have underscored the Pennsylvania courts' willingness to
look to the state privacy right as a source of practical protection
against intrusions into areas of modern life which would have re-
ceived ample protection under broader interpretations of the Fed-
eral Constitution no longer extant.
It is the purpose of this comment to trace the history and devel-
opment of the right of privacy as a matter of Pennsylvania consti-
tutional law, primarily as it has been interpreted as a source of
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures, and against
unwarranted electronic surveillance. Realistic examples of how the
right may be invoked will also be provided, highlighting the under-
lying policies and practical aspects of what may prove to be a
growing source of legal protection in the 1990's.
I. COMMON LAW FOUNDATION OF THE PRIVACY RIGHT AND EARLY
CONSTITUTIONAL RECOGNITION
Prior to Warren and Brandeis' 1890 landmark article on the fed-
eral right of privacy,7 claims for what today would constitute inva-
sions of the state privacy right were decided based upon a sup-
posed right of property for breach of trust or confidence." The first
reference9 to a right of privacy embodied in Pennsylvania law oc-
curred in Waring v WDAS Broadcasting Station, Inc.,10 in which
5. 526 Pa 374, 586 A2d 887 (1991). Edmunds concerned the search of a building and
seizure of marijuana based upon a warrant which was defective due to a magistrate's errone-
ous determination of probable cause. Edmunds, 586 A2d at 890. While the fruits of such a
search would have been admissible under the Fourth Amendment given the "good faith
exception" to the exclusionary rule created by the United State Supreme Court's ruling in
United States'v Leon, 468 US 897 (1984), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court looked to the
state constitution and found therein a right of privacy sufficient to preclude the application
of such an exception as a matter of state law. Leon, 469 US at 901.
6. 133 Pa Commw 285, 576 A2d 79 (1990), aff'd on other grounds Pa, 605 A2d 1198
(1992). In Barasch, the commonwealth court found. the implementation of technology
known as "Caller ID" violative of the right of privacy embodied in the Pennsylvania Consti-
tution. The supreme court affirmed without addressing the constitutional issue.
7. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv L Rev 193
(1890).
8. Harlow v Buno Co., Inc., 36 Pa D & C 101, 103 (1939). This case is discussed
more fully in note 20.
9. One earlier case made reference to a right of privacy rooted in the state constitu-
tion. In Re Contested Election in Fifth Ward of Lancaster City, Appeal of Bare, 281 Pa
131, 126 A 199 (1924), involved a right of privacy in elections as being expressed in a 1901
amendment to Pa Const, Art VIII, § 4 (renumbered in 1967 as Pa Const, Art VII, § 4).
However the decision does not involve a general privacy right, but rather a specific right to
secrecy in voting, and as such is beyond the scope of this comment.
10. 327 Pa 433, 194 A 631 (1937).
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the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was asked to decide whether the
unauthorized radio broadcast of a recording of the plaintiffs music
constituted such an invasion of his rights as to justify injunctive
relief as granted by the trial court. The majority opinion affirmed
on the grounds, inter alia, that the station's actions infringed upon
the exclusive rights of the plaintiff to the independent work of art
represented by its recorded orchestral production, without refer-
ring to the privacy right." In a controversial12 concurring opinion,
Justice Maxey stated that the right which the defendants invaded
was more than an economic one; it was the right to privacy itself.13
The following year the Pennsylvania Supreme Court again con-
sidered the right of privacy, this time as protecting against over-
reaching by a state legislative committee. In Annenberg v Rob-
erts,14 the plaintiffs sought to establish protection against a
legislative commission's subpoenas requesting virtually all of their
financial records and related documents, ostensibly in furtherance
of an investigation into the need for legislation concerning illegal
gambling. Finding that the subpoenas constituted a search and
seizure, the court ruled that in order for such a request to comport
with the protections afforded one's privacy under Article I, section
8 of the state constitution, it must be reasonable in scope.15 This
would be determined by examining whether the materials re-
quested were relevant to and within the limited right of inquiry of
the legislature, as is pertinent to the procurement of information
upon which proposed legislation is to be based. The court pro-
ceeded to quote a lengthy list of United States Supreme Court de-
cisions supporting the contention that the right of privacy is the
one most protected against unreasonable and unlimited legislative
or other governmental investigations.1 6
Nevertheless, the court ultimately based its decision that the
subpoenas were invalid on their overbreadth, as opposed to their
11. Waring, 194 A at 635.
12. Justice Maxey's reasoning in Waring was criticized as a misapplication of the
privacy doctrine in a widely read article by Wilfred Feinberg, Recent Developments in The
Law of Privacy, 48 Colum L Rev 713, 714 (1948).
13. Waring, 194 A at 642 (Maxey concurring).
14. 333 Pa 203, 2 A2d 612 (1938).
15. Annenberg, 2 A2d at 617. This view was echoed by the supreme court in its plu-
rality opinion in Lunderstadt v Penna House of Representatives Select Committee, 513 Pa
236, 519 A2d 408, 411 (1986). In Lunderstadt the court held that under Article I, section 8,
no valid subpoena could issue seeking records in which one has a reasonable expectation of
privacy, except upon showing of probable cause that the particular records sought contained
evidence of civil or criminal wrongdoing. Lunderstadt, 519 A2d at 411.
16. Annenberg, 2 A2d at 618.
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invasive character. The court concluded that instead of requesting
that the plaintiffs produce specific items of evidence germane to
the legislative inquiry, the commission impermissibly demanded
that a mass of books and papers be furnished so that they could
examine them in a general search for evidence. 17 Possibly because
the holding was not founded specifically on the privacy issue, it did
not immediately encourage interest in the state constitutional
right, though later courts did cite Annenberg for its privacy
component.
Justice Maxey's Waring concurrence has been frequently cited
in support of the existence of a state right of privacy. One such
case which cited the concurrence was Leverton v Curtis Publishing
Co.," in which the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit decided a tortious invasion of privacy diversity suit arising
from defendant's publication of an auto accident victim's photo
twenty months after the incident."9 In deciding that publication of
the photo in a generic article unrelated to the news event violated
the plaintiff's right to privacy, the court found it unnecessary to
engage in a discussion of the brief evolution of the right due to
defendant's admission that such existed under Pennsylvania law.20
Maxey's opinion was again cited in Schnabel v Meredith,2 in
which plaintiff sought damages for defamation from a newspaper.
The basis of the suit was the publication of an article which reiter-
ated the fact that gambling machines had been found on the plain-
tiff's property six months earlier.22 Noting plaintiff's citation of
Waring and several trial court decisions recognizing the right to
privacy,2" the supreme court assumed, without deciding, that a
right of privacy existed, but held that based upon the individual
facts of the case the plaintiff did not fall within its protection.2
17. Id.
18. 192 F2d 974 (3d Cir 1951).
19. Leverton, 192 F2d at 975.
20. Id. The court in a footnote cited the decisions of the Court of Quarter Sessions of
Philadelphia in Clayman v Bernstein, 38 Pa D & C 543 (1940), and Harlow v Buno Co.,
Inc., 36 Pa D & C 101 (1939), which found that a right of privacy existed, relying on
Maxey's Waring concurrence, despite their observance of the fact that no Pennsylvania ap-
pellate court had yet recognized the right. In defining the right to privacy, the court in
Harlow stated that its true nature "is one which is closely akin to the rights of personal
security and personal liberty and is derived from the natural law." Harlow, 36 Pa D & C at
103-04.
21. 378 Pa 609, 107 A2d 860 (1954).
22. Schnabel, 107 A2d at 861.




The common law notion of a privacy right rooted in natural law
continued in force as essentially the sole means of privacy protec-
tion in Pennsylvania throughout the 1950's. A number of decisions,
all in actions for tortious invasion of privacy, were rendered with-
out mentioning the state constitution as their basis, apparently be-
cause the challenged conduct was engaged in by private parties in-
stead of government officials.2
It was not until 1955 that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was
presented with the specific question of whether a privacy right ex-
isted under the state constitution. In Commonwealth v Chaitt,26
the defendant appealed his conviction for illegal gambling upon
the ground that evidence obtained as a result of wiretapping by
police violated his right against unreasonable search and seizure
under both the state and federal constitutions. The supreme court
majority ruled that the police actions in intercepting Chaitt's tele-
phone conversations did not violate his rights because the federal
and state constitutions only protected one's right against unrea-
sonable searches and seizures in material things. However, the
underlying view of the Pennsylvania Constitution as a general
source of privacy protection was discussed more fully by the dis-
sent of Justice Musmanno.
Justice Musmanno's dissent eloquently noted that had the tele-
phone been invented prior to the state constitutional convention of
1873, he had little doubt that the drafters would have specifically
included wiretapping within the ambit of unreasonable searches
prohibited by Article I, section 8.28 Looking beyond the section's
language, Musmanno found the invasive conduct of police in inter-
cepting a personal telephone communication to be covered within
the principle, if not the letter, of section 8.29
This reasoning from the Chaitt dissent was reaffirmed by Justice
Musmanno eleven years later in his majority opinion in Common-
wealth v Murray." In what was apparently the first recognition by
a Pennsylvania appellate court majority of a right to privacy
25. See, for example, Hunter v Hunter, 169 Pa Super 498, 83 A2d 401 (1951), ad-
dressing an invasion of privacy occasioned by interspousal electronic surveillance. See also
Board of School Directors, etc. v Snyder, 346 Pa 103, 29 A2d 34, 39 (1942) (Maxey dissent-
ing), demonstrating the manner in which the court viewed a claim of invasion of privacy by
a teacher based on her termination for lifestyle-related reasons.
26. 380 Pa 532, 112 A2d 379 (1955).
27. Chaitt, 112 A2d at 382.
28. Id at 385 (Musmanno dissenting).
29. Id. For the text of Article I, section 8, see note 4.
30. 423 Pa 37, 223 A2d 102 (1966).
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grounded in a specific section of the state's organic document, the
Murray court noted that Article I, section 1 of the Pennsylvania
Constitution protects a number of indefeasible rights against state
encroachment, including the right to one's pursuit of happiness. 1
Comparing the inviolability of privacy to that of tangible property,
the court stated that among the pursuits of happiness is privacy,
and that "[e]avesdropping which amounts to trespassing is an in-
vasion of privacy protected by the organic law of the land.
'32
Since Chaitt and Murray, litigation regarding the state constitu-
tional right to privacy has developed primarily in five sub-areas:
search and seizure, electronic surveillance, mandatory Ethics Act
disclosures, medical records and the physician-patient privilege,
and abortion funding restrictions. While a complete examination of
all these subject areas is beyond the scope of this comment, in ad-
dressing those issues primarily impacting the rights of criminal de-
fendants, it is hoped that the evolution of the right to privacy, its
differing sources, and the policies underlying its interpretation will
converge to produce a sense of the direction Pennsylvania appel-
late courts may take in the future in protecting this right in its
various contexts.
II. SEARCH AND SEIZURE
The area most commonly associated with governmental intru-
sion into privacy is that of searches and seizures conducted by law
enforcement officers. As federal courts have eroded protection of
Fourth Amendment 3 rights, for example, by limiting the situa-
tions in which the exclusionary rule is mandated, Pennsylvania's
appellate decisions interpreting Article I, section 8 of the state con-
stitution have begun to expand, providing an alternate remedy for
victims of searches conducted by officers of the state and its politi-
cal subdivisions.
The first case to recognize the state constitutional right of pri-
vacy in the area of search and seizure was Commonwealth v
31. Murray, 223 A2d at 109. For the text of Article I, section 1, see note 3.
32. Murray, 223 A2d at 109.
33. The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particu-
larly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
US Const, Amend IV.
562 Vol. 31:557
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Platou. 4 The defendant in Platou sought to exclude from evidence
marijuana seized from his suitcase, located in a friend's apartment,
discovered when police executed a search warrant on the premises.
Prior to entering the -apartment, police had no knowledge of the
presence of either the defendant or his suitcase." The trial court
admitted the evidence and Platou was convicted of marijuana
possession.
In reversing the conviction, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
held that the evidence should have been suppressed as being seized
in violation of the defendant's right to privacy. 36 The majority de-
cision found this right existing when one seeks to preserve his ef-
fects as private, even if they are accessible to the public or to
others.37 In so holding, the court relied solely on federal precedent
interpreting the Fourth Amendment. However, in footnotes it
pointed out that the text of Article I, section 8 of the state consti-
tution differed slightly from that of the Fourth Amendment,8 and
that the case's rationale concerning the federal amendment was
equally applicable to the state constitutional provision. 9 Thus, in
Platou the supreme court embraced the then-extant federal view
of privacy protection as defining the scope of the state constitu-
tional right.
This practice of interpreting the state constitutional right of pri-
vacy as coterminous with the Fourth Amendment, remained the
norm until the landmark decision in Commonwealth v DeJohn."
DeJohn represented the first expression by a Pennsylvania appel-
late court interpreting Article I, section 8 as a separate and inde-
pendent source of the right of privacy apart from the federal con-
stitution. The case concerned the admission at defendant's murder
trial of motive evidence in the form of information concerning her
checking account activity, which had been obtained by police with-
out a warrant.41 The procurement of such information had been
explicitly approved by the United States Supreme Court in United
States v Miller,42 which held that such information had sufficient
34. 455 Pa 258, 312 A2d 29 (1973), overruled by Commonwealth v Reese, 520 Pa 29,
549 A2d 909 (1988).
35. Platou, 312 A2d at 31.
36. Id at 34.
37. Id.
38. Id at 34 n 11.
39. Id at 31 n 2.
40. 486 Pa 32, 403 A2d 1283 (1979).
41. DeJohn, 403 A2d at 1291.
42. 425 US 435 (1976).
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public exposure in the ordinary course of writing checks, etc., to
make one's expectation of privacy therein unreasonable.' 3
In terming the Miller holding a "dangerous precedent," the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court went on to independently analyze
whether the provisions of the state constitution were sufficiently
broad to provide protection for such records." The court noted
that its freedom to expand the protection against searches and
seizures under the state constitution was subject to broader inter-
pretation than that of the Fourth Amendment. "5
The court first invoked the Platou rule, providing privacy pro-
tection for those possessions which one seeks to preserve as private
even though they may be accessible to others.' The court next
proceeded to analyze the reasonableness of one's expectation of
privacy in their bank checking account information, rejecting the
Supreme Court's Miller holding, and instead embracing in large
part the analysis of the California Supreme Court in Burrows v
Superior Court of San Bernardino County. 7 In that case, the Cal-
ifornia high court had interpreted its state constitution as provid-
ing greater coverage for the right of privacy than the Fourth
Amendment, thereby prohibiting police access to such information
without a search warrant."8 In concluding that the Pennsylvania
Constitution's Article I, section 8 likewise provided protection for
such records, the DeJohn court reasoned that while checks are ex-
posed to the public for a limited time in the course of their issu-
ance and negotiation, they become one's private information fol-
lowing their exit from commercial circulation.49 Thus, the account
holder's expectation that his records will be private is a reasonable
one.
50
The DeJohn court expressly rejected the Commonwealth's con-
tention that Burrows was distinguishable because the California
Constitution specifically refers to privacy. By referring to what
they termed the "adequate state ground" upon which Platou
rested, the supreme court reiterated the holding that in Pennsylva-
nia the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures in
43. Miller, 425 US at 442.
44. DeJohn, 403 A2d at 1289.
45. Id at 1288.
46. Id at 1289.
47. 118 CalRptr 166, 529 P2d 590 (1974).
48. Burrows, 529 P2d at 594-95.
49. DeJohn, 403 A2d at 1290-91.
50. Id at 1290.
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Article I, section 8 is tied into the implicit right to privacy.51
The supreme court further expanded the reach of Article I, sec-
tion 8 to provide automatic standing to persons charged with pos-
sessory offenses in Commonwealth v Sell.2 Previously, the United
States Supreme Court had refused to grant such standing under
the Fourth Amendment in Rakas v Illinois.5 3 In making its deci-
sion, the court in Sell rejected the vague "legitimate expectation of
privacy" the federal standard in this area of search and seizure,
based on its perception that the standard needlessly detracted
from the critical element of protecting individuals against unrea-
sonable governmental intrusion.54 The logic in Rakas was unper-
suasive to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, which held that, on
the independent ground of Article I, section 8, a person charged
with a possessory offense has automatic standing to challenge its
admission as evidence.55
The greater significance of Sell comes from its language concern-
ing the basic substance of the privacy right as forming the back-
ground against which search and seizure challenges are to be
judged under the state constitution. The court stated that Article
I, section 8 had consistently been interpreted by that body as
"mandating greater recognition of the need for protection from il-
legal government conduct offensive to the right of privacy."5 The
decision reiterated the holding in Platou that a person's right is
founded on his act of maintaining the privacy of his possessions in
such a fashion that such expectation of freedom from intrusion is
recognized as reasonable.5 7 By this statement, the Sell court com-
pleted the transformation of the Platou rationale from one origi-
nally appearing coterminous with federal precedent, to a clearly
adequate and independent state ground for the heightened protec-
tion of privacy in the context of search and seizure under the
Pennsylvania Constitution.
The rule of Sell received qualified application by the Pennsylva-
nia Superior Court in Commonwealth v Ferretti.8 The defendant
in Ferretti was in a friend's apartment when police executed a
51. Id at 1291.
52. 504 Pa 46, 470 A2d 457 (1983).
53. 439 US 128 (1978).
54. Sell, 470 A2d at 468.
55. Id at 468-9.
56. Id at 468.
57. Id at 468-9.
58. 395 Pa Super 629, 577 A2d 1375 (1990).
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search warrant for the purpose of securing evidence against the
apartment's lessee, for whom an arrest warrant had been issued in
connection with a burglary and assault. 9 After arresting the de-
fendant in his friend's apartment, police executed a search warrant
on the premises which uncovered a sawed-off shotgun allegedly
used in the crimes.60
In an effort to suppress the weapon as evidence, the defendant
attempted to challenge the validity of the search warrant on the
grounds that it violated his reasonable expectation of privacy. The
trial court, holding that the defendant lacked standing to challenge
the warrant, denied the suppression motion. On review, the supe-
rior court used the occasion to interpret the supreme court's Sell
decision.
Writing for a majority of the panel, Judge Popovich noted that
in Sell, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had only discarded the
"legitimate expectation of privacy" test in connection with inquir-
ies into whether automatic standing existed in situations where
one was charged with a possessory offense.1 Its validity had in no
way been diminished in other areas concerning privacy law.2 The
court then proceeded to analyze the defendant's situation vis-a-vis
the weapon, in an effort to determine whether he had such an ex-
pectation of privacy in the shotgun located in a friend's apartment.
After noting several facts, including that the defendant lacked a
history of residing in the apartment, did not possess a key thereto,
and kept none of his clothing there, the court concluded that there
was an insufficient connection between the defendant and the
apartment premises to justify his expectation of privacy therein."
Judge Wieand's concurring opinion in Ferretti took a different
view of the privacy issue and the relevance of Sell. In examining
the basis for the right claimed by the defendant, that being his
privacy interest in his possessions, the concurring opinion read Sell
as reaffirming the language in Commonwealth v Platou"I that so
long as a person seeks to preserve his effects as private, even if
accessible to others, they are accorded protection under Article I,
section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. Therefore, since the
59. Ferretti, 577 A2d at 1376-77.
60. Id at 1377.
61. Id at 1379-80.
62. Id at 1379.
63. Id at 1380-81.
64. 455 Pa 258, 312 A2d 29 (1973).
65. Ferretti, 577 A2d at 1383-84.
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facts indicated that the defendant had been legitimately on the
premises for a number of hours prior to the warrant's issuance,
combined with the fact that he had an ongoing close relationship
with the apartment's lessee, the concurrence would have found
that the defendant had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the
premises searched."6
These differing views of the implications of Sell demonstrate the
division which has existed of late among the various Pennsylvania
courts and panels which have attempted to interpret the signifi-
cance of privacy related decisions and the extent of privacy protec-
tion. While there appears to be universal agreement that Pennsyl-
vania search and seizure law provides greater protection for
individual privacy than is accorded under the Fourth Amendment,
differences arise when attempting to practically apply this. protec-
tion to unique factual situations.
The federalistic judicial philosophy has been reaffirmed in what
is the strongest statement to date by the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court concerning the state right of privacy. In Commonwealth v
Edmunds,67 the court was faced with the question of whether, as a
matter of state constitutional law, there should be a good faith ex-
ception to the operation of the exclusionary rule. The question
arose when police searched a shed on the defendant's property
pursuant to a search warrant, the issuance of which was later de-
termined to be based upon an incorrect assessment of probable
cause by the magistrate. (Under the United States Supreme Court
decision in United States v Leon," evidence seized under such cir-
cumstances would be admissible under the Fourth Amendment.)
In addressing this question, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
engaged in a detailed analysis of the history of the Pennsylvania
constitutional provision, Article I, section 8, and its relation to the
66. Id at 1383. However, Judge Wieand found the defendant's challenge to the war-
rant's validity to be without merit, thus concurring with the majority's affirmation of sen-
tence. Id at 1384.
67. 526 Pa 374, 586 A2d 887 (1991). For a complete analysis of this case see Note,
Commonwealth v Edmunds, 30 Duquesne L Rev 115 (1991).
68. 468 US 897 (1984). The Court in Leon rationalized that since such evidence was
seized in reasonable reliance on a facially valid warrant, the officers in essence did every-
thing that could be expected of them in order to comply with the Fourth Amendment. Leon,
468 US at 920-1. Since the exclusionary rule's primary purpose is to deter police miscon-
duct, the Court, finding none in this context refused to apply the rule as a remedy. Id. This
essentially leaves the victim of the search powerless to challenge the admission of evidence
which had nonetheless been seized from him through the collective efforts of government




Fourth Amendment. This led the court to the conclusion that Arti-
cle I, section 8 embodied a strong notion of privacy, "carefully
safeguarded in this Commonwealth for the past two centuries."69
In reaching the conclusion that the strength of this right negated
the possibility of the admission of any evidence seized as a result
of its violation, the court looked to its previous decisions in Platou
and DeJohn, as well as those decisions addressing the issue in the
context of electronic surveillance.7 0 The Edmunds case thus stands
as the clearest expression to date in what has been an unbroken
chain of Pennsylvania Supreme Court decisions strongly support-
ing Article I, section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution as a bul-
wark against the admission of evidence seized in violation of the
right against unreasonable search and seizure.
Additions and refinements to these basic rules governing the ap-
plication of the state right of privacy in regard to searches and
seizures have arisen in a series of ancillary cases. A survey of these
cases reveals that major emphasis is placed on the reasonableness
of the privacy expectation claimed. The decisions collectively re-
veal several types of factors analyzed by Pennsylvania courts in
determining reasonableness in the search and seizure context.7
One factor appears to be the extent to which the individual
seeks to keep his affairs private. Thus, it has been held that the
failure to close louvers on a fan, allowing air circulation but also
permitting a limited public view of the room's interior from the
roof of a nearby building, did not negate the occupant's reasonable
69. Edmunds, 586 A2d at 897. The court noted, inter alia, the fact that Article I,
section 8 predated the Fourth Amendment by more than a decade, and that the text of the
Pennsylvania provision remained essentially unchanged since its establishment in 1776. Id
at 896-97.
70. For an analysis of case law concerning the right of privacy in the context of elec-
tronic surveillance, see Section III.
71. An examination of several cases helps to illustrate the parameters of reasonable-
ness in the search and seizure context. In Commonwealth v Cameron, 385 Pa Super 492, 561
A2d 783 (1989), the court found that the defendant lacked a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy in an abandoned house which contained a television, couch, and platter of food. With-
out foreclosing the possibility that under different circumstances a vacant structure might
be considered to be a "dwelling place" within the purview of Article I, section 8, the court
found under the facts of the case that such items were insufficient attributes of a home.
Cameron, 561 A2d at 788. More significantly, the defendant had no right to enter house and
had no right to exclude others. Nevertheless, the court noted, under the decision in Com-
monwealth v Sell, 504 Pa 46, 470 A2d 457 (1983), he still possessed the right to challenge
the constitutionality of the search and seizure of contraband from the abandoned house.
Cameron, 561 A2d at 786.
The unexpressed question of whether "reasonableness" is to be viewed objectively or sub-
jectively, however, remains to be answered in future decisions.
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expectation of privacy.72 Another Pennsylvania court has indicated
that the reasonableness of one's expectation of privacy in the con-
tents of a closed container may be influenced by the appearance of
the container. Under what may be characterized as the "rare sin-
gle-purpose container" rule, if a container is of such a type that its
common purpose would admit of only a single use, one has no ex-
pectation of privacy in the contents therein because by the
container's very nature its contents can be inferred from their out-
ward appearance. 3
The expectation of privacy is also determined to a certain extent
by the degree of control exercised over the object of the search. If
one possesses premises or an item in common with another, courts
have reasoned that each person's expectation of privacy is less
than if he had sole possession or ownership. The test employed in
regard to this factor is less clear, however, being in essence a total-
ity of the circumstances test enunciated in a Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court plurality.7 4 Another consideration in applying the
right of privacy is the balancing of interests between those of the
individual in maintaining his privacy, and that of society in
preventing crime and maintaining order.75
72. Commonwealth v Soychak, 221 Pa Super 458, 289 A2d 119 (1972).
73. See Commonwealth v Kendrick, 340 Pa Super 563, 490 A2d 923 (1985), wherein a
film vial was found to be such a single-purpose container. The court validated a warrantless
opening of the vial by police, which revealed narcotics inside, because the vial's appearance
would give rise to the inference that film was inside; therefore, since anyone would know
what was inside, no expectation of privacy therein could exist.
74. Commonwealth v Latshaw, 481 Pa 298, 392 A2d 1301 (1978), cert denied 441 US
931 (1979).
The manner in which this test has been applied indicates its elasticity under varying cir-
cumstances. The court's plurality in Commonwealth v Wagner, 486 Pa 548, 406 A2d 1026
(1979), held that a defendant, who spent a good deal of time at his fiancee's home, including
nights and weekends, had a reasonable expectation of privacy as to such premises and had
standing to challenge lawfulness of search of such premises which resulted in his arrest.
Similarly, in Commonwealth v Rodriguez, 385 Pa Super 1, 559 A2d 947 (1989), the supe-
rior court held that a defendant's act of discarding a key to an abandoned building from
which she fled constituted a relinquishment of her interest in the building's contents, so
that she could no longer assert a reasonable expectation of privacy therein. Thus, the de-
fendant lacked standing to challenge a subsequent warrantless search of the building by
police, which revealed a large quantity of cocaine. Rodriguez, 559 A2d at 949.
75. For example, the court held in Commonwealth v Robinson, 399 Pa Super 199, 582
A2d 14 (1990), that in viewing one's expectation of privacy in an automobile, the balance
struck between passengers' privacy rights and the safety of police officers investigating
stopped vehicles is no different under the Pennsylvania Constitution than under the Fourth
Amendment. Accordingly, the actions of police in requiring occupants to alight from the
vehicles during traffic stops was held to pass muster under Article I, section 8. Robinson,
582 A2d at 16.
See also the plurality decision in Commonwealth v Tarbert, 517 Pa 277, 535 A2d 1035
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In summary, the right of privacy under Article I, section 8 of the
state constitution has been interpreted in the context of searches
and seizures as providing broader coverage than that of the federal
Fourth Amendment. The only significant prerequisite to a valid in-
vocation of the right is that the claimed expectation of privacy
must be reasonable. Once this fact is established, the court will
then apply a balancing test, weighing the claimed right against any
significant public safety or societal interest involved. Generally, in
the search and seizure context, the individual's right of privacy is
accorded heavy weight and yields only in those instances where ei-
ther the societal interest is great, or conversely, where that interest
is important and the intrusion into individual privacy is minimal.
If the claim emerges successfully from this process, then the right
of privacy under Article I, section 8 is generally recognized by the
Pennsylvania courts.
The importance of raising the state constitutional privacy issue
should not be underestimated by counsel challenging the legality
of a search or seizure. It would behoove the practitioner faced with
a possibly illegal search and seizure by state or municipal law en-
forcement officers to raise the challenge simultaneously, yet dis-
tinctly, under both the Fourth Amendment and Article I, section 8
of the state constitution. Failure to raise the state grounds will re-
sult in a determination only on the federal grounds, invoking
precedents which of late have not been conducive to the protection
76of individual privacy. Indeed, a contemporary example of the
detrimental failure to raise state constitutional grounds occurred in
(1987), in which the court employed the balancing of the interests test to uphold the use of
DUI checkpoints by police under an Article I, section 8 challenge.
Similarly, in Commonwealth v Blouse, Pa , 611 A2d 1177 (1992), the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court in a 4-3 decision upheld the constitutionality of systematic, nondiscriminatory,
nonarbitrary roadblocks, for the purpose of ensuring safety on highways by disclosing regis-
tration, licensing and equipment violations, against an Article I, section 8 privacy challenge.
The court conducted a balancing test, finding that the compelling state interest in protect-
ing citizens from harm (i.e., "the mass carnage that results from unlicensed drivers and
unsafe vehicles occupying the road") outweighed the individual's privacy interests. Blouse,
611 A2d at 1179.
76. See, for example, National Treasury Employees Union v Von Raab, 489 US 656
(1989), and Skinner v Railway Labor Executives' Assn., 489 US 602 (1989), which upheld
the practice of random drug. and alcohol tests as reasonable under the Fourth Amendment,
even though there was no requirement of a warrant or a reasonable suspicion that any par-
ticular employee might be impaired, due to the compelling government interest served by
the regulations, which outweighed employees' privacy concerns. See also Florida v Riley, 488
US 445 (1989), which upheld aerial surveillance of a residential area from an altitude of 400
feet, as not constituting a "search" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, and thus
not implicating personal privacy interests.
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Commonwealth v Green.7 The defendant in Green was a proba-
tioner whose parole officer conducted a warrantless search of his
bedroom following an arrest for violations of curfew and drug
treatment conditions of his parole. While finding the search consti-
tutional under the Fourth Amendment, the court noted in closing
that, given the recent expansion of the state right to privacy in
Edmunds, the results in Green may have been different had the
search been challenged on state constitutional grounds.78
III. ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE
Another sub-area of state constitutional privacy law, closely re-
lated to search and seizure, concerns the legality of electronic sur-
veillance conducted by law enforcement agents. Rooted in the
same foundation case of Commonwealth v Murray,79 the law sur-
rounding constitutional protection for communications electroni-
cally transmitted has taken a course demonstrating both similari-
ties and differences to that of conventional search and seizure law.
While Murray established basic constitutional protection for
telephone communications under Article I, section l's indefeasible
rights clause, the extent of the coverage for such communications
apart from statutory provisions remained an open question until
the Pennsylvania Superior Court decision in Commonwealth v
Beauford.80 The court therein was faced with the question of the
77. 405 Pa Super 24, 591 A2d 1079 (1991).
78. Green, 591 A2d at 1086. Another example of the consequences which can result
from the failure to defensively raise the state constitutional right to privacy is evident in
Commonwealth v Peterson, 408 Pa Super 22, 596 A2d 172 (1991), the issues of which coun-
sel necessarily formulated prior to the Edmunds decision.
In Peterson the court held that under the Fourth Amendment, if a house used for the sale
of illegal drugs was a defendant's "home" and thus he could possess a legitimate expectation
of privacy therein, the necessity to obtain a search warrant before entering following a drug
sale conducted through a hole in the door was nevertheless obviated due to the existence of
exigent circumstances.
While it is uncertain whether a similar result would have been reached under the state
constitution, clearly the decision was much more easily realized using federal precedents.
Given the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's rejection of the "amorphous legitimate expecta-
tion of privacy" 'standard for analyzing state privacy claims in Sell, 470 A2d at 468, it is
likely that a different result would have been reached in Peterson had the state constitu-
tional issue been properly preserved and raised.
Based on the fact that a defendant can only benefit from counsel's raising of a state con-
stitutional privacy claim in cases involving an arguably improper search and seizure, it ap-
pears that such failure could constitute grounds for a motion for post-conviction collateral
relief claiming that such failure constituted ineffectiveness of counsel.
79. 423 Pa 37, 223 A2d 102 (1966). For a more complete discussion of this case, see
notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
80. 327 Pa Super 253, 475 A2d 783 (1984).
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legality of the warrantless installation of a pen register and dialed
number recorder by police."1
In the course of their investigation into gambling activities, of-
ficers installed such devices on several defendants' telephone lines
in an effort to obtain information as to the destination of calls be-
ing placed therefrom. After obtaining this information via the pen
register, and determining the duration of such calls using a dialed
number recorder, police obtained a search warrant for various loca-
tions occupied by the defendants. Execution of the warrant re-
sulted in the discovery of gambling paraphernalia and controlled
substances. In their suppression motion, defendants alleged that
the warrantless use of the pen register and dialed number recorder
violated the state constitutional right to privacy. The trial court
denied these motions, and all six defendants were found guilty fol-
lowing non-jury trials.
8 2
The superior court approached this issue by applying the reason-
ing from Beauford8s and extending the coverage given checking ac-
count information therein to the information obtainable through a
pen register. The basis for this decision was the perceived lack of
distinction between the privacy interests involved. The judges, fail-
ing to find a meaningful difference between check writing and the
dialing of telephone numbers, noted that allowing police to indis-
criminately attach pen registers would reveal information regard-
ing the intimate and mundane acts of the innocent, as well as the
nefarious acts of the guilty. 4 While this information is routinely
gathered by the phone company, an individual has a reasonable
expectation that it will not be divulged to law enforcement author-
ities or others.85 The court also found independent public' policy
support in Pennsylvania's long history of legislation protecting the
privacy interest inherent in a telephone call, including a complete
ban on law enforcement wiretapping for most of the twentieth
century.8 6
81. A pen register is a device which records the numbers dialed on a particular phone
line, and the time and date of such activity, but does not intercept the audio portion of the
communications; a dialed number recorder (or DNR) of the type involved in this case per-
forms a similar function, and also monitors the length of time the targeted telephone is off
the hook on outgoing and incoming calls. Beauford, 475 A2d at 786.
82. Id at 785.
83. 486 Pa 32, 403 A2d 1283 (1979). For a more complete discussion of this case, see
notes 40-51 and accompanying text.
84. Beauford, 475 A2d at 789.
85. Id at 789-90.
86. Id at 790.
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The Beauford decision did not mandate a blanket prohibition on
the police use of pen registers. While their use is expressly ex-
empted from the anti-wiretapping statute, 1 the court nevertheless
found an individual's expectation of privacy in the numbers he di-
als to be reasonable, legitimate, and therefore constitutionally pro-
tected against government surveillance in the absence of a warrant
issued upon probable cause. 88
The support of privacy protection for the spoken word began to
diminish, however, in Commonwealth v Harvey,8 9 a decision pur-
porting to authorize police to engage in participant monitoring.90
In Harvey, police recorded an in-person conversation between
their informant and the defendant during the course of a cocaine
transaction. When they attempted to introduce the recording as
evidence, the defendant challenged the constitutionality of the
practice which was ostensibly permitted by 18 Pa Cons Stat Ann
section 5704(2)(ii)9 The Pennsylvania Superior Court panel rea-
soned that since one has no privacy interest in their words once
uttered, there could be no reasonable expectation as to the privacy
of such words which would render their recordation by police a vi-
olation of the right of privacy embodied in Article I, section 8. The
decision, while recognizing that the state constitution may afford
87. At the time of the Beauford case, the anti-wiretapping statute read in pertinent
part:
It shall not be unlawful under this chapter for:
(5) Any investigative or law enforcement officer, or communication common carrier
acting at the direction of an investigative or law enforcement officer on in the normal
course of its business, to use a pen register.
18 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 5704(5) (Purdon 1983).
88. 18 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 5704(5) (Purdon 1983).
89. 348 Pa Super 544, 502 A2d 679 (1986).
90. Participant monitoring is that practice whereby a police officer or person acting
in concert therewith consents to having his conversation monitored and/or recorded by law
enforcement authorities. United States v White, 401 US 745, 789 n 23 (1971). The practice
is apparently authorized in Pennsylvania by 18 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 5704(2)(ii) (Purdon
1983 & Supp 1992).
91. At the time of the Harvey decision, Chapter 57 (Wiretapping and Electronics
Surveillance) of the Crimes Code read in pertinent part:
It shall not be unlawful under this chapter for:
(2) Any investigative or law enforcement officer or any person acting at the direction
or request of an investigative or law enforcement officer to intercept a wire, electronic
or oral communication involving suspected criminal activities where:
(ii) one of the parties to the communication has given prior consent to such
interception.
18 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 5704(2)(ii) (Purdon 1983).
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greater protection against unreasonable searches and seizures than
the Fourth Amendment, held that nothing in contemporary state
constitutional thought would offer protection against the recorda-
tion by law enforcement authorities of a person's voluntarily made
statements.9 2
As the holdings in Murray and Beauford indicate, the Harvey
decision seemed to go against the flow of established precedent.
Due to the incongruity of this holding, and its nonexistent state
jurisprudential support, it was inevitable that the issue would re-
surface for consideration. When this occurred three years later in
Commonwealth v Schaeffer,"5 the issue was considered by the en-
tire superior court en banc.
The facts in Schaeffer, though similar to those in Harvey, in-
volved an additional privacy component because the monitoring
took place in the defendant's home, where one would be expected
to enjoy the highest degree of privacy protection. In an exhaustive
and well-reasoned opinion the court expressly reversed Harvey, re-
jecting the distinction between nonconsensual monitoring of con-
versations and monitoring with the consent of a government in-
formant.9 ' Referring to electronic eavesdropping through the use of
government informers as "manifestly unreasonable," the Schaeffer
court found explicit protection for the spoken word existing under
Article I, section 8, preventing the monitoring or recording of an
in-person conversation by law enforcement agents without first
procuring a warrant based on probable cause.9 5
The decision capitalized on the distinction between the govern-
ment's utilization of an informant as a witness and the greater in-
trusion posed by the use of electronics monitoring.9 6 The court
clearly distinguished section 8 as providing a greater level of pri-
vacy protection in this area than is accorded by the Fourth
Amendment.9 7 After conducting a thorough analysis of Pennsylva-
nia and federal precedent, 98 the superior court concluded that the
question of whether the Pennsylvania Constitution forbids war-
rantless participant monitoring was one of determining what pri-
92. Harvey, 502 A2d at 684. In so holding, the court quoted no state court precedents
and relied, insofar as the privacy analysis was concerned, exclusively on federal decisions
interpreting the Fourth Amendment.
93. 370 Pa Super 179, 536 A2d 354 (1987).
94. Schaeffer, 536 A2d at 360.
95. Id.
96. Id at 368.
97. Id at 359.
98. Id at 362-67.
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vacy expectations society was prepared to recognize as reasonable
and legitimate."" In making its determination, the superior court
found little distinction between the police conduct in sending an
informant equipped with a transmitting device into a person's
home, and the planting of a bugging device therein. 100 Previously,
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had held that what takes place
behind the closed doors of one's home enjoys the highest degree of
privacy known to our society. 101 Based upon this rule, the Schaef-
fer court concluded that the expectation of privacy in what one
speaks within the confines of his home is a reasonable one and
should be protected as a matter of Pennsylvania constitutional law,
even though the United States Supreme Court had not seen fit to
provide such protection under the Fourth Amendment."0 2
The Schaeffer decision marked the high point of protection for
face-to-face verbal communications. When the issue of participant
monitoring by government officers finally reached the Pennsylva-
nia Supreme Court for review in Commonwealth v Blystone,'0 the
high court expressly adopted the rationale expressed in Harvey,
thus deciding to make the federal view the law of Pennsylvania
regarding this aspect of the state privacy right. As a result, pursu-
ant to the supreme court's interpretation of 18 Pa Cons Stat Ann
section 5704(2)(ii), police are apparently free under Article I, sec-
tion 8 to conduct warrantless electronic monitoring and recording
of oral conversations so long as they first obtain the permission of
one of the parties involved (e.g., an informant or participating po-
lice officer).104
The issue may not, however, be as firmly settled as it seems for
several reasons. First, Blystone was a multi-issue capital case in-
volving a particularly callous and gruesome murder. It involved
participant monitoring of the defendant which produced a record-
ing of incriminating statements which proved crucial to the convic-
tion. Secondly, the events took place in 1983, years before such
tactics were disapproved in Harvey and thus, the officers involved
in the Blystone monitoring had no reason to believe that their con-
99. Id at 368.
100. Id.
101. Id at 369 quoting Commonwealth v Shaw, 476 Pa 543, 383 A2d 496, 499 (1978).
102. Id at 371.
103. 519 Pa 450, 549 A2d 81 (1988).
104. An example of this rule's application can be found in Commonwealth v Brion,
381 Pa Super 83, 552 A2d 1105 (1989), wherein it formed the cornerstone of the brief opin-
ion upholding the admission of evidence gained via warrantless participant monitoring in a
drug case. Brion, 552 A2d at 1108.
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duct was illegal. Accordingly, without expressly stating so, the su-
preme court may have been applying a pragmatic form of good
faith exception for the police conduct under the specific circum-
stances of the case, as opposed to limiting privacy protection for
the spoken word under the state constitution.
In this regard, it is interesting to note that the Blystone opinion
does not mention Schaeffer, even though the case is clearly related.
While the Blystone court took only a few paragraphs in a twenty
page opinion to superficially reject reasoning similar to that con-
structed in the scholarly Schaeffer opinion, the extent of permis-
sion for police participant monitoring is not yet fully outlined.
This view is bolstered by the fact that the participant monitoring
in Blystone is distinguishable from that in Schaeffer, as the former
surveillance did not occur in the defendant's residence. As a result,
it is entirely possible that the permissible scope of participant
monitoring conducted by police within a subject's residence re-
mains unsettled.
When the supreme court disallowed the warrantless installation
of a pen register by police as violative of the privacy rights inher-
ent in Article I, section 8 in Commonwealth v Melilli,10 5 it pro-
vided a glimmer of hope that the privacy right was still a viable
concept in their view of interpersonal communications. The Melilli
decision grew out of a police investigation which employed pen
registers, and later court- approved wiretaps, in an effort to gather
evidence on corrupt organizations and illegal gambling.' As a re-
sult of the information gained from such devices, police obtained
search warrants for numerous locations. When executed, these war-
rants uncovered gambling paraphernalia and controlled
substances.
The trial court granted the defendant's motion to suppress all
items of evidence because they were tainted by the improper war-
rantless use of the pen register. The superior court reversed the
suppression order based on their belief that a good faith exception
to the exclusionary rule existed.10 7
105. 521 Pa 405, 555 A2d 1254 (1989).
106. Melilli, 555 A2d at 1256.
107. Id at 1254. The good faith exception to the exclusionary rule under the Fourth
Amendment originated in United States v Leon, 468 US 897 (1984), and suspends operation
of the exclusionary rule where police act in good faith reliance on a facially valid warrant
issued by a neutral and detached magistrate, which warrant later proves defective for lack of
probable cause.
In Commonwealth v Melilli, 361 Pa Super 429, 522 A2d 1107 (1987), the superior court
extended this logic by analogy to cover the warrantless installation of a pen register by
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In reviewing the lower court's action, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court expressly approved the superior court's holding in Beauford,
which prohibited the warrantless installation of pen registers by
police.108, Recognizing Beauford as the product of a long line of
Pennsylvania appellate cases expanding the state privacy right be-
yond that federally protected, and the integrated nature of tele-
phone activities, the supreme court refused to treat the dialing of
telephone numbers differently from other parts of telephonic com-
munication.109 Based upon this and other grounds, the superior
court decision was reversed and the trial court's suppression order
reinstated. 110
The most expressive decision to date concerning the right of pri-
vacy against electronic surveillance came in the offensive use of Ar-
ticle I, section 8 in Barasch v Pennsylvania Public Utility
Comm'n.111 The case involved a challenge to the proposed offer of
a technology known as Caller ID to telephone subscribers by Bell
Telephone Company of Pennsylvania. The proposed service would
be achieved via a digital readout device which would attach to a
subscribers telephone line and provide the number of the calling
party during the first ringing interval.
When Bell initially filed for tariff approval of the service by the
Public Utility Commission (PUC), an administrative law judge
(ALJ) determined, after conducting hearings, that Caller ID con-
stituted a trap and trace device, the installation and usage of
which violated the wiretap statute."' The PUC, however, disre-
garded the ALJ's determination and approved use of the service,
with limited blocking to be made available for certain domestic vi-
olence centers, law enforcement agencies, employees of such orga-
police at a time prior to the practice being ruled illegal in Commonwealth v Beauford, 327
Pa Super 253, 475 A2d 783 (1984).
The good faith exception to the exclusionary rule has since been held inapplicable as
being incompatible with Article I, section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. Common-
wealth v Edmunds, 526 Pa 374, 586 A2d 887 (1991).
108. Melilli, 555 A2d at 1258.
109. Id at 1259.
110. Id at 1263.
111. 133 Pa Commw 285, 576 A2d 79 (1990) aff'd on other grounds Pa ,605 A2d
1198 (1992).
112. Id at 83. The anti-wiretapping. statute provides in pertinent part:
(a) General rule.-Except as provided in this section, no person may install or use a
pen register or a trap and trace device without first obtaining a court order under
section 5773 (relating to issuance of an order for a pen register or a trap and trace
device).
18 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 5771(a) (Purdon 1983 & Supp 1992).
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nizations, and persons certified by law enforcement agencies to
have a need for blocking of their number from being made availa-
ble to Caller ID subscribers. " 3 Both parties appealed to common-
wealth court."'
After initially determining that the service constituted an imper-
missible trap and trace device in violation of the Wiretap Act, the
court proceeded to consider the petitioner's contention that the
service violated their right to privacy under the federal and state
constitutions. "' Bell countered that such constitutional protec-
tions could not be successfully implicated because the offering of
the service did not involve the requisite state action.""
After analyzing the aggregate of the factors present in the case,
the court noted that the action taken by the PUC in approving
Bell's request to offer the service constituted state action sufficient
to justify application of constitutional prohibitions." 7 The court
then proceeded to review the violation of the state right to privacy
allegedly presented by the service.
Beginning by noting the supreme court's recognition of the pri-
vacy right under Article I, sections 1 and 8 in Denoncourt v State
Ethics Comm'n,"5 the Barasch court examined the expansion of
113. Barasch, 576 A2d at 82.
114. Id.
115. Id at 86.
116. Id.
117. Id at 87.
118. 504 Pa 191, 470 A2d 945 (1983). This case presented the supreme court with the
question of the constitutionality of that provision in the Ethics Act (Act of October 4, 1978,
1978 Pa Laws 883, §§ 4, 5, and 9, codified at 65 Pa Stat §§ 404, 405, and 409 (Purdon Supp
1992)), imposing criminal penalties upon a candidate for the failure of certain specified im-
mediate family members to make the required financial disclosures.
The petitioner had requested review of this provision based on its failure to comport with
the due process clause of the federal and state constitutions. However, in the plurality opin-
ion by Justice Flaherty, the court sua sponte also addressed the issue of the infringement on
the privacy rights of a public official's family members.
The privacy right initially found to be implicated was that contained in Article I, section
1, and the court looked to the two-pronged method of analysis adopted in the context of
medical records privacy by In Re June 1979 Investigating Grand Jury, 490 Pa 143, 415 A2d
73 (1980). Under this view, the privacy right is brought into question if the regulation in-
volves (1) a freedom from disclosure of personal matters or (2) the freedom to make certain
important decisions.
Finding that the regulations in question implicated the first of these interests, the su-
preme court in Denoncourt then applied a balancing test, weighing the individual's right to
be free from personal disclosures against the state interest involved. In light of this test, the
court found that the petitioners had a constitutionally cognizable privacy interest in the
nondisclosure of their personal matters which was of greater strength than the questionable
public interest in financial disclosures of an office holder's family.
The rule which appears to be evident from the Denoncourt plurality appears to be that
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the right to cover numbers dialed (in addition to the voice compo-
nent of calls) in Beauford and Melilli. Based upon this line of
cases, the commonwealth court expressed little doubt that the pri-
vacy right also covered the unauthorized seizure or distribution of
one's telephone number.1 19
Further persuasion that Caller ID threatened an important pri-
vacy interest was found by the commonwealth court in the reason-
ing of Commonwealth v Murray.2 0 The court cited language there-
from observing the long tradition of a jealous regard for personal
privacy and the public fear of technological threats to privacy as
being on par with the fear of crime.' Therefore, the common-
wealth court concluded that "[iun the framework of a democratic
society, the privacy rights concept is much too fundamental to be
compromised or abridged by permitting Caller ID.'
22
On appeal, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the com-
monwealth court. 23 Its decision, however, was based solely on the
fact that the proposed Caller ID service constituted a trap and
trace device, the installation of which violated the provisions of the
wiretapping statute.124 Since the court was able to base its decision
on this non-constitutional ground, it followed the practice of not
addressing a constitutional question unless such was required for
resolution of an issue. 1l s Thus, the supreme court Barasch decision
does not discuss the state right of privacy.
While the final word on Barasch is that of the supreme court
opinion, the significance of the commonwealth court's decision
nevertheless lies in several areas. First, it provides a detailed exam-
ination of the privacy concept as it relates to emerging issues in
telecommunications. As such, it provides a blueprint for future liti-
gators, furnishing the latest example of the manner in which the
state privacy right can be effectively argued in an offensive manner
in combatting privacy threats posed by modern technological
governmental intrusion into a person's private affairs is constitutionally justified only when
the governmental interest is significant and there is no alternate reasonable method of lesser
intrusiveness to accomplish the governmental purpose; and if the intrusion does not effect
the state's purpose, it is a gratuitous one, and not purposeful.
119. Barasch, 576 A2d at 88.
120. 423 Pa 37, 223 A2d 102 (1986). For a more complete discussion of this case, see
notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
121. Barasch, 576 A2d at 89 citing Murray, 223 A2d at 112 (Roberts concurring).
122. Barasch, 576 A2d at 89.
123. Barasch v Penn Public Utility Comm'n, Pa , 605 A2d 1198, 1201 (1992).
124. Barasch, 605 A2d at 1203.




Secondly, the commonwealth court opinion illustrates the fine
line of state action which must be crossed before constitutional
rights become applicable. In Barasch, the supreme court found the
requisite state involvement in the Public Utility Commission's ap-
proval process statutorily required before telecommunications
providers can implement a new service. It is important to note that
were such approval not required for a provider to offer a poten-
tially intrusive service such as Caller ID, the state constitution
would be inapplicable. 26 Finally, the commonwealth court opinion
in Barasch indicates that court's willingness to apply the state con-
stitutional privacy right without equivocation in appropriate cases.
Today, the amount of state constitutional privacy protection af-
forded citizens in Pennsylvania against government-conducted or
approved electronic surveillance appears to be strong. The deci-
sions reveal a generally stricter protection of the right, evidencing
less of a balancing of the interests approach than has been applied
in the context of search and seizure. Instead, courts have looked
almost exclusively to the legitimacy of the claimant's privacy ex-
pectation in deciding whether a particular government action is
unreasonable. Where one's privacy expectation is considered legiti-
mate, government intrusion via electronic surveillance may not
take place absent authorization in the form of a warrant based on
probable cause as outlined in the anti-wiretapping statute and Ar-
ticle I, section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. 27
The ability to offensively invoke state privacy rights has only re-
cently been exercised in regard to electronic surveillance. This
may, however, prove to be an area of increased litigation in in-
stances where either government action threatens privacy interests
or state government approval is required prior to private imple-
mentation of a service which threatens individual privacy.
126. This highlights the significance of the need for government regulation of new
forms of telecommunications, as well as private database services which amass information
on citizens and make it available to the public. According to the commonwealth court's logic
in Barasch, a litigant may only successfully invoke relevant constitutional protections if
state government approval must first be secured before such services are offered.
127. In Commonwealth v Hashem, 526 Pa 199, 584 A2d 1378 (1991), the court noted
that the state anti-wiretapping statute, being in the nature of a statute in derogation of the
Commonwealth's constitutionality protected right of privacy, must be strictly applied.
Hashem, 584 A2d at 1381-82. Therefore, a defendant claiming that evidence was obtained in
violation of the statute's provisions need not bear the burden of showing how the failure to




An abstract view of case law, while exposing the reader to gen-
eral principles therein, does not fully attune one to recognize situa-
tions where the pertinent rules can be applied. In order to sharpen
this ability, it is helpful to consider potential fact patterns which
could give rise to colorable claims under the relevant state consti-
tutional sections.
The following paragraphs present hypothetical situations involv-
ing potential threats to the right of privacy. Each is followed by an
analysis of how the Pennsylvania constitutional right of privacy, as
discerned from the above decisions, could possibly be utilized.
They are intended to be thought-provoking, and to serve as exam-
ples of the types of situations where counsel could raise the state
privacy right, either offensively or defensively, alone or in combi-
nation with other legal strategies.
A. To What Extent May Video Surveillance Be Conducted in a
Public Building?
In an effort to curb drug dealing and usage by its employees,
Blue County has installed concealed cameras in various areas
throughout the county office building. Several of such cameras
have been installed in restrooms, following reports by confidential
informants that drug related activities occur there. While using the
restroom facilities, Employee E smokes a marijuana cigarette and
his activity is recorded by the concealed video equipment. Upon
exiting he is confronted by county police who arrest him on
charges of possession of a controlled substance in violation of state
law. Non-employee N engages in the same conduct and is likewise
arrested and charged.
Counsel for both E and N file a motion to suppress the video's
use as evidence at their trials. They do so on the grounds that it
was obtained in violation of their client's right to privacy under
Article I, section 8 of the state constitution. Additionally, E files an
action to enjoin further video surveillance of the restroom
facilities.
The threshold question for the Pennsylvania court would be the
determination of whether E and N had a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the location where they smoked the marijuana. As both
defendants used the marijuana inside the restroom stalls, it is most
likely that the court would find that society would recognize an
expectation of privacy in that location as reasonable.
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Depending upon the court's disposition, however, they could
look to other factors, such as the fact that other persons within the
confines of the room could see the smoke and recognize the unique
odor of burning marijuana. Under this alternate view, the court
would not be condoning the installation of cameras in such loca-
tions, but rather, would be ruling that the video would not be sup-
pressed as evidence because the illegal conduct which it depicts
could reasonably be detected by persons lawfully in other locations
within the restroom. Thus, since the defendants' had not taken all
precautions against detection of the illegal conduct by others
outside their allegedly "private" space, their expectation of privacy
in smoking the marijuana inside a restroom stall may not be recog-
nized as reasonable. Therefore, the video would not be suppressed
as evidence.
As to E's action seeking an injunction against further video sur-
veillance, the court would most likely recognize the threatened fu-
ture invasions of E's privacy represented by the practice. From this
point, the court would'probably analyze the state's interest to de-
termine if it is compelling. Such could be found in the county's
interest in maintaining a drug free workforce. If this were found to
be a sufficiently strong state interest, the court would then apply
the Denoncourt balancing test."'
Determining whether or not the state interest justifies such an
intrusion depends, in part, on whether the intrusion will effect its
purpose. Obviously, video cameras in a county office building rest-
room will reveal illegal drug activity there. However, the second
component of the Denoncourt test also requires that the govern-
ment use the least intrusive method available consistent with pro-
tection of the public interest. Accordingly, the court could reasona-
bly conclude that other measures could be implemented which
would address the public interest involved, and thus, find grounds
for enjoining the use of such video surveillance equipment.
The purpose of this hypothetical scenario is to illustrate a situa-
tion where the right of privacy may be raised to provide protection
against government conduct which reasonable people would find
repugnant. In a deeper sense, however, it highlights the role played
by judicial decisionmaking in this area and how the exercise of
such discretion could result in nonprotection against what on the
surface seems to present a clear cut privacy violation.




B. Does the Automatic Number Identification (ANI) Feature of
9-1-1 Telephone Systems Violate the State Privacy Right?
The County of Eastmoreland has recently augmented their
countywide emergency 9-1-1 telecommunications system with a
feature which displays the number of all incoming calls to the 9-1-
1 number. This new feature, known as automatic number identifi-
cation (ANI), was approved by the PUC prior to its being offered
by the phone company, on the grounds that it represented an effi-
cient means of preventing abuse of 9-1-1 telephone service. Before
this enhancement, the emergency telephone system protected
against false alarms and harassing calls with a system which per-
mitted them to "hold," but not display the number of any suspi-
cious call for later determination of its origin in the event of a false
emergency call.
Citizen P, a resident of Eastmoreland County, resides in an area
where all emergency services are dispatched by the 9-1-1 center.
While he desires the benefit of quick emergency dispatching which
the center provides, he does not wish to have his unlisted home
telephone number revealed to the center's staff. P brings an action
requesting an injunction to prevent the invasion of his privacy
rights represented by the seizure and disclosure of his telephone
number each time he dials 9-1-1.
In addressing P's action, the court would have a difficult time
getting around the privacy interest recognized in Melilli and
Barasch as extending to cover one's telephone number. While,
strictly speaking, there is no controlling precedent on this point,
the observation in both the commonwealth and supreme court
Barasch majority opinions that such a practice in the Caller ID
format represents an illegal trap and trace device as defined in the
anti-wiretapping statute, certainly seems to compel the same con-
clusion when applied to the automatic number identification com-
ponent of modern 9-1-1 systems.129
129. In a concurring and dissenting opinion in the commonwealth court Barasch deci-
sion, Judge Pellegrini expressed the view that Caller ID technology, in the form known as
"Enhanced 9-1-1," was permissible. After agreeing with the majority opinion that Caller ID
as proposed by Bell violated the anti-wiretapping statute, he opined that the finding relative
to the state constitutional right to privacy was unnecessary under the doctrine of judicial
restraint. Barasch, 576 A2d at 91 (Pellegrini concurring and dissenting).
Pellegrini proceeded to consider, sua sponte, the question of whether Enhanced 9-1-1 ser-
vice would violate the state constitution. Pellegrini stated in dicta that 18 Pa Cons Stat Ann
§ 5704(3) (Purdon 1983 & Supp 1992) provided legislative approval for Caller ID type tech-
nology in the form of Enhanced 9-1-1. This rationale lacks credence, however, as section
5704(3) only permits the tape recording, under strictly controlled circumstances, of tele-
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As highlighted by the first hypothetical, the courts have applied
a mode of analysis to privacy claims which involves the determina-
tion of the existence of a compelling state interest, followed by a
balancing of the interests and inquiry as to the minimum level of
intrusiveness required to protect the public interest. This method
has not been followed, however, in the context of electronic surveil-
lance. Instead, as illustrated by Murray, Melilli, and the Barasch
commonwealth court decision, courts tend toward strict prohibi-
tions against intrusions into telecommunications privacy. As yet,
no decisions involving the privacy of electronic communications
has engaged in the balancing of interests found in most other pri-
vacy contexts, and it appears doubtful that appellate courts will
adopt such a method.
Given the recognition of a privacy interest violated by the
seizure and disclosure of one's telephone number by the party
called, it is difficult to envision how ANI technology, even when
used in the context of an emergency telephone system, can com-
port with individual privacy interests. The impact technology such
as ANI can have on personal privacy interests is illustrated by the
supposed anonymity enjoyed by persons who report suspected ille-
gal activity to police, a practice encouraged by contemporary anti-
drug programs. Most such information is passed on anonymously
via the telephone between the citizen and the police dispatch
headquarters. In an area like the fictitious Eastmoreland County,
citizens such as P have no alternative except to dial 9-1-1 if they
desire to make an anonymous report, as the police are all dis-
patched by centralized 9-1-1 center. With ANI, these reports can
never be truly anonymous, as the caller's number is displayed
without their consent or knowledge, thereby forcing them to dis-
close their phone number, and thus other identifying information,
each time they make a report to the government. When one con-
siders such an argument in light of the language in the Barasch
commonwealth court decision, expressly rejecting such public
safety concerns advanced in support of Caller ID, it appears highly
phone calls going into and out of police and county emergency communications centers. The
basis for this opinion is probably more deeply rooted in the dissent's statement that "[in a
fast moving technological era, innovation may have benefits to society that in some in-
stances might outweigh an individual's right to privacy." Id at 95. The error of such reason-
ing is that it presumes overbroadly that rights are relative to the product of increased tech-




likely that P's challenge to the use of ANI by Eastmoreland
County 9-1-1 would succeed.130
III. CONCLUSION
The strong statements made by Pennsylvania appellate courts
indicate the momentum the state constitutional privacy right pres-
ently possesses. The impetus for growth undoubtedly flows from a
combination of the federal appellate judiciary's conservatism and
the growing threat to individual privacy posed by expanding com-
puter technology and new means of accessing personal electronic
communications. Given the background presented above, the state
privacy right presents an important tool in the hands of litigators
to combat modern threats to the right to be left alone.
The availability of an adequate and independent state constitu-
tional source of protection presents the potential for its expansion
to cover intrusions into areas of personal life unheard of even ten
years ago. The right's fluid nature, lending to interpretation in
light of contemporary social principles and perceptions, makes it
an especially suitable vehicle to utilize both offensively and defen-
sively against intrusive state conduct."'1
The right to privacy embodied in Article I of the Pennsylvania
Constitution provides a strong and independent source of individ-
ual protection in the expanding information age of the 1990's.
Given the present conservative majority on the United States Su-
preme Court, it is unlikely that civil rights advocates can antici-
pate expansion of the federal Constitution's coverage of this right.
Therefore, the protections implicitly found in Article I, sections 1
130. Barasch, 576 A2d at 88 n 6. The commonwealth court majority agreed with the
AW's conclusion that other services provided by Bell are equipped to reduce harassing and
obscene telephone calls without any of the statutory or constitutional violations inherent in
Caller ID. Particularly, the court mentioned call tracing as the appropriate response to
harassing, annoying, and obscene telephone calls. Id.
131. Failure to offensively invoke the state privacy right can have a negative effect on
litigation. In McCusker v WCAB (Rushton Mining Co) Pa Commw , 603 A2d 238
(1992), the commonwealth court upheld the constitutionality of a workers' compensation
statute requiring termination of a widower's death benefits if claimant engages in a meretri-
cious relationship. The court found that the provision was rationally related to the legisla-
ture's purpose of encouraging marriage and legally recognized family relationships, and thus
did not violate her constitutional rights to privacy, due process, or equal protection. The
decision, however, was based only on privacy claims under the federal constitution. It is
interesting to ponder whether, had the issues been raised under the Pennsylvania Constitu-
tion as well, the privacy component would have been decided differently.
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and 8, should become an important tool for use by Pennsylvania
litigators throughout the decade to come.
Louis A. Smith, II
